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We study the role of old-age pensions, disability insurance and healthcare in accounting 
for the differing labor supply patterns of older individuals across countries. We develop a 
life cycle model of labor supply and health with heterogeneous agents. In our framework, 
people choose when to stop working and when/if to apply for disability and pension 
beneﬁts. We ﬁnd that the incentives faced by older workers differ hugely across countries. 
In fact, based solely on differences in social insurance programs, the model predicts even 
more cross-country variation in the employment rates of people aged 55–69 than we 
observe in the data.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
While the employment rates of prime-aged males are very similar across OECD countries, the employment rates of older 
workers differ considerably. The employment rates of males aged 60–64 in France, Germany and the Netherlands are below 
60% of the U.S. level. Australia, Canada, Denmark and Spain exhibit intermediate rates of employment, with employment 
rates of men aged 60–64 at above 80% of the U.S. level. The employment rates for men aged 60–64 are high in the U.K. 
and Sweden, with employment in the U.K. at roughly the same level as in the U.S. and even slightly higher in Sweden. 
The differences in employment rates become even more pronounced above age 65. There are also sizable differences in the 
disability incidence rates across countries. Canada, France and Germany have low rates of disability insurance incidence, 
with below 6% of the population aged 50–64 collecting beneﬁts. Conversely, the U.S., the U.K., Spain and Australia exhibit 
intermediate rates of between 6% and 10%, whereas the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark have high rates of between 13% 
and 16%.
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insurance and healthcare, as well as the tax rates needed to fund said programs. Countries differ in the generosity of 
retirement beneﬁts and in the access to early retirement. Most working-age Americans receive healthcare through their 
employer, and for a substantial share of them health insurance coverage is contingent on working. Medicare eligibility 
starts at age 65. All of the European countries, as well as Canada and Australia, have a public healthcare system. The large 
differences in social insurance programs result in large cross-country variation in the tax wedge. The average effective labor 
tax burden in the U.S. is less than 0.3, in continental Europe it is around 0.5 and in the Scandinavian countries it is close 
to 0.6. The European tax schemes also exhibit a greater degree of progressivity than the U.S. tax scheme.
The differences in government programs create very different incentives for workers nearing the retirement age. In this 
paper we study the role of old-age pension beneﬁts, disability insurance and healthcare in accounting for the cross-country 
differences in the labor supply behavior of older workers. To this end, we develop a life cycle model of labor supply and 
health. Individuals differ with respect to educational attainment, health insurance coverage and their preference for leisure. 
Individuals choose when to stop working and when/if to apply for disability and old-age pension beneﬁts. The granting of 
disability insurance beneﬁts is correlated with health, but the screening process is imperfect. In equilibrium, some people 
who are granted beneﬁts are in fact healthy, while some of the people denied beneﬁts are truly disabled. Individuals care 
about their health and can partially insure against health shocks by investing in health. Health expenditures are dependent 
on health insurance coverage.
We calibrate the model to U.S. data. We then alter the old-age pension, disability insurance and healthcare programs to 
reﬂect those in place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the U.K., in turn.
We ﬁnd that older workers face very different incentives for continued employment in the various OECD countries 
under study. Generous social insurance programs create large incentives for early retirement in France, Spain, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. With the exception of France, the incentives for early retirement in these countries arise in large 
part from the generous disability insurance schemes. In France, the old-age pension scheme creates strong incentives for 
early retirement. Conversely, less generous social security programs encourage older workers to remain employed in the 
U.K., Canada, Australia and Germany. Public health insurance dampens the incentives for continued employment in all of 
the countries under study. Comparing the model predictions to the data, we note that the model predicted employment 
rates for older workers in Canada, the U.K. and Germany are somewhat too high relative to the data. Conversely, the model 
predicted employment rates for Spain, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands are somewhat too low relative to the data. 
For Spain and the Netherlands, this is in large part due to over-predicted disability insurance incidence rates. The model 
predicted employment rates for France and Australia are more in line with the data. Our results carry over when we add 
cross-country variation in earnings proﬁles to the model.
We ﬁnd that, based on differences in social insurance programs, the model actually predicts even larger differences in 
the labor supply patterns of people aged 55–69 than we observe in the data. It is worth stressing that modeling endogenous 
disability insurance is important for capturing the differences in incentives for early retirement across countries. In light of 
our ﬁndings, the puzzle is not so much why Europeans work less than Americans, but rather why, given the incentives built 
into the social insurance systems, some Europeans work as much as they do. Our results suggest that something outside 
our model dampens the labor supply effects arising purely from the incentives built into institutions. We explore possible 
candidate explanations in the Sensitivity Analysis section.
There is a vast literature on retirement and disability insurance claiming, and a growing literature on health insurance.1
From a modeling standpoint, the paper closest to ours is French (2005). The estimation in French (2005), exploiting micro-
data for the U.S. and using a method of simulated moments, is clearly more involved than our approach of exploiting more 
aggregated data in the calibration. The richness of our framework comes from the endogeneity of health and from modeling 
additional social insurance programs not present in his paper. In our framework, individuals can inﬂuence their health, and 
thereby their likelihood of ending up on disability insurance, by investing in health. Also, individuals decide whether or 
not to apply for disability insurance beneﬁts. Based on Low et al. (2010) we allow for imperfect screening in the granting 
of disability insurance beneﬁts. Moreover, our framework draws from French and Jones (2011) in distinguishing between 
types of health insurance coverage. Our paper also contributes to a growing literature on the role of tax and transfer pro-
grams in accounting for cross-country differences in labor supply. See, e.g., Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008), Wallenius
(2013), McDaniel (2011) and Erosa et al. (2012). Relative to this literature, the novel features of our framework are again 
the endogeneity of both health and disability insurance claiming. While many of the key ingredients of our model, namely 
old-age pension beneﬁts, disability insurance and health insurance, have been studied extensively separately, we stress that 
combining these features in one framework is extremely important for the model predictions. Our result regarding the over-
prediction of disability insurance incidence in some European countries is similar in spirit to that of Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2006), who ﬁnd it hard to reconcile generous unemployment insurance beneﬁts with the observed employment rates in 
Europe.
An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 presents the model, and Section 3 describes the calibration procedure. Section 4
presents the results from the policy exercise. Section 5 concludes.
1 See for example Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Pozzebon and Mitchell (1989), Stock and Wise (1990), Berkovec and Stern (1991), Rust and Phelan
(1997), French (2005), Gruber and Wise (2004, 2009), Coile and Gruber (2007), Coile and Levine (2007), French and Song (2014), Low et al. (2010) and 
French and Jones (2011).
74 T. Laun, J. Wallenius / Review of Economic Dynamics 22 (2016) 72–922. Model
We develop a discrete time life cycle model to evaluate the effects of various government programs on labor supply 
across countries. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. Individuals differ with respect to 
education, health, health insurance coverage and their preference for leisure. We model two education groups, college 
and non-college. The motivation for this is that the labor supply behavior of these groups differs substantially, as does 
the share of college educated workers across countries. We assume no heterogeneity in the initial health of agents, but 
subsequently allow for divergence in health due to both shocks to and investments in health. Health expenditures vary 
substantially with health insurance coverage. Whether health insurance coverage is contingent on working (tied health 
insurance) or whether it continues even after the individual is no longer employed (retiree health insurance) has potentially 
important labor supply implications. This is particularly important since Medicare coverage does not start before age 65. We 
therefore model three health insurance categories: retiree health insurance, tied health insurance and no health insurance.2
We assume people differ in their preference for leisure; in particular, we model a low and high type. Moreover, we allow 
the disutility from work to depend on health and education. The reason for introducing some preference heterogeneity is 
that variation in health and skill is not enough to generate suﬃcient variation in retirement ages. One can also think of the 
preference heterogeneity as capturing features not explicitly modeled here, such as job characteristics, the number and age 
of grandchildren, the health and age of a spouse, etc. All together, there are 12 combinations of education, health insurance 
coverage and preference for leisure, which we term types.
A model period is a year, and individuals live for 56 periods with certainty. We do not model educational attainment. 
Hence, model age zero corresponds to age 25 in the data.
2.1. Preferences
Letting a denote model age, an individual of type s has preferences over sequences of consumption (c), labor supply (l) 
and health (h) given by: 
E
55∑
a=0
βa
[
ln(ca,s) − b(ha,s, s)la,s + ha,s
]
, (1)
where β is the discount factor. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time each period. Preferences are assumed to 
be separable and consistent with balanced growth, thereby dictating the ln(c) choice. We assume that the disutility from 
working is dependent on preference type (low or high disutility type), education and health. Speciﬁcally, we posit that 
working is more unpleasant the worse one’s health.3 The health of an individual also enters directly in the utility function.4
2.2. Budget constraint
Each period there are markets for consumption, labor, capital (k) and health investment (ih). The exogenous age-varying 
wage proﬁle differs based on educational attainment and is denoted by wa,s . Let r denote the interest rate and pa,s the cost 
of health investment as a function of health insurance status (or type). The individual faces a sequence of budget constraints 
given by: 
(1+ τc)ca,s + ka+1,s − (1+ r)ka,s + pa,siha,s = (1− τy(ya,s))ya,s + DIa,s − cDIa,s + Ra,s (2)
where ya,s denotes labor income, Ra,s retirement beneﬁts, DIa,s disability beneﬁts and cDIa,s the cost of applying for disability 
beneﬁts. τc denotes a proportional tax on consumption and τy(·) a progressive tax on labor income.
We impose a no-borrowing constraint, ka,s ≥ 0, as a way of ensuring that people work when young, even at a low wage.5
We abstract from bequests.
Labor income is the product of the exogenous, age-dependent wage and labor supply, ya,s = wa,sla,s .6 We assume a 
discrete labor choice. The individual either works full-time or not at all, la,s ∈ {0, ¯l}.7
2 Note that this implies that if an individual with tied health insurance coverage retires before age 65, he/she is without health insurance from the time 
of retirement up to the age of 65.
3 This is an alternative to assuming that productivity (or the wage) is health dependent, since both result in a distribution of retirement ages. French
(2005) ﬁnds surprisingly little difference in the wages of healthy and unhealthy individuals in the United States. Kemptner (2013) also ﬁnds that the 
coeﬃcient for health is small and insigniﬁcant when estimating a wage equation for Germany.
4 We also experimented with a speciﬁcation with decreasing returns to health. The results are essentially unaffected.
5 In the absence of a borrowing constraint, and with exogenous wages and individuals choosing the timing of work, people would choose not to work 
when young but rather at a higher wage later on. This is contrary to what we observe in the data.
6 The price per eﬃciency unit of labor has been normalized to one.
7 This assumption is motivated by the observation that the dominant form of retirement in the data is a transition from full-time work to no work. See 
Rogerson and Wallenius (2013).
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Following the OECD self-assessed health measure, we discretize health into ﬁve states: very good, good, fair, bad and 
very bad. All individuals start out in very good health. Health is endogenous and individuals can partially insure against 
health shocks by investing in health. Health investments take the value of zero or one. Health evolves according to the 
following law of motion: 
ha+1,s = ha,s + IHIa,siha,s + εha,s. (3)
IHIa,s is an indicator function, which takes the value one if the health investment is effective and zero otherwise. The proba-
bility that the health investment is effective is dependent on both the age and the health of the individual. εha,s denotes the 
exogenous health shock, the probability of which is also age- and health-dependent.
2.4. Social security
Both retirement and disability beneﬁts depend on the age and past earnings of the claimant. Speciﬁcally, a worker’s 
retirement beneﬁt is based on average monthly earnings from the 35 highest years of earnings, or AIME for Average Indexed 
Monthly Earnings. Since the beneﬁt is based on earnings from 35 years, when the worker has worked fewer than 35 years 
the beneﬁt increases unambiguously: 
AIMEa+1,s = AIMEa,s + wa,sla,s
35
if a < 35. (4)
Once the worker has worked for more than 35 years, the beneﬁt only increases if earnings exceed average earnings: 
AIMEa+1,s = AIMEa,s +max
{
0,
wa,sla,s − AIMEa,s
35
}
if a ≥ 35. (5)
For simplicity, we throw out an average year of earnings, instead of the lowest year. This is in line with French (2005). The 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is a piece-wise linear function of average monthly earnings, speciﬁcally, 90% of average 
monthly income up to the ﬁrst kink (b1), and 32% of the excess of monthly income over the ﬁrst kink but not in excess of 
the second kink (b2), plus 15% of monthly income in excess of the second kink: 
PIA =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0.9AIME if AIME ∈ [0,b1]
0.9b1 + 0.32(AIME− b1) if AIME ∈ (b1,b2]
0.9b1 + 0.32(b2 − b1) + 0.15(AIME− b2) if AIME > b2
(6)
In 2007, the ﬁrst kink occurred at $680 and the second kink at $4100. The actual retirement beneﬁt depends on the PIA
and the age at which the individual starts collecting beneﬁts. The ﬁrst age at which people can start collecting social security 
retirement beneﬁts is 62. However, for an individual whose full-retirement age is 65, beneﬁts are adjusted downward by 
5/9 of 1 percent per month for each month in which beneﬁts are received in the three years immediately prior to the 
full-retirement age. Workers claiming beneﬁts after the full-retirement age earn a delayed retirement credit, which is 2/3 
of 1 percent for each month up to age 70.8 One does not have to stop working to collect beneﬁts.9 For simplicity, we do 
not allow for cycling between working and not working in the model. So, while individuals can continue working while 
collecting retirement beneﬁts, once they stop working they cannot return to work. The social security wage base is capped; 
in 2007 the cap was set at $97,500.
The disability insurance beneﬁt is computed similarly to the retirement beneﬁt with the exception that beneﬁts are not 
based on the 35 highest years of earnings. Rather, disability insurance beneﬁts are based on lifetime earnings with the ﬁve 
lowest earnings years excluded from the calculation for awardees over the age of 43 (fewer years for younger awardees). 
Disability insurance eligibility also requires that a person has worked in ﬁve of the ten years preceding the application 
for disability beneﬁts. People cannot work while collecting disability insurance. In the model we assume that disability 
insurance claiming is an absorbing state. All disability insurance claimants are automatically transferred into retirement at 
the age of 65. Beneﬁts are unaffected by this transition.
The collection of disability insurance beneﬁts is contingent on both applying for beneﬁts and being awarded them. The 
probability of being awarded said beneﬁts is dependent on the health and age of the applicant. While the probability of 
receiving beneﬁts is higher the worse the health of the individual, the imperfections associated with screening are captured 
by assuming a positive probability of receiving beneﬁts in all health states. Moreover, the probability of receiving beneﬁts 
8 The full-retirement age is gradually being raised from 65 to 67, depending on birth year.
9 If a person is below the full-retirement age and works while collecting social security beneﬁts, he/she is subject to an earnings test and beneﬁts are 
reduced if earnings exceed a certain threshold. However, these individuals are compensated after reaching the full-retirement age, and the adjustments are 
considered roughly actuarially fair. We therefore abstract from the earnings test.
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insurance will be in quite good health and conversely, not everyone in bad health will be awarded beneﬁts. The cost of 
applying for disability insurance beneﬁts is denoted by cDIa,s , and incurred irrespective of whether the individual is granted 
disability insurance beneﬁts or not. This cost is proportional to earnings prior to applying for disability insurance, and 
intended to capture lost earnings associated with applying for disability insurance.
2.5. Taxes
The government levies a proportional tax on consumption (τc ) and a progressive tax on labor income (τy(ya,s)). The 
government uses the proceeds from these taxes to ﬁnance the retirement and disability insurance beneﬁts. We assume 
that the remaining tax revenue is thrown away. This is equivalent to assuming that the additional tax revenue is spent 
on government consumption which the agent values, as long as the government consumption does not affect the marginal 
utility of private consumption. An often cited example of this nature is defense spending.
2.6. Recursive formulation
We can write the individual’s decision problem in recursive form. In order to simplify the notation, here we suppress the 
dependence on type s. The state x of an individual is given by age a, assets k, health h, average income from best 35 years 
AIME, pension status page (age at which started claiming pension beneﬁts, if claiming), disability status dage (age at which 
started claiming disability beneﬁts, if claiming), work status rage (age at which stopped working, if no longer working). 
Individuals know x at the start of the period and decide how much to consume, how much to save, whether or not to 
invest in health, weather or not to work, and, if applicable, whether or not to apply for pension/disability beneﬁts (denoted 
by appR and appDI , respectively). We assume that individuals claiming pension beneﬁts can work, whereas individuals 
collecting disability beneﬁts cannot. Moreover, we assume that beneﬁt claiming and retirement are absorbing states (i.e.,
once the individual stops working, he/she cannot return to work).
The value of state x is:
V (x) = max
c,k′,ih,l,
appDI,appR
u(c, l,h) + βEV(x′) (7)
s.t. (1+ τc)c + k′ − (1+ r)k + p(x)ih = (1− τy(x))w(x)l + DI(x) − cDI(x) + R(x). (8)
The Computational Appendix provides a detailed description of how this model is solved.
3. Calibration
In this section we discuss the process of assigning values for the model parameters. We calibrate the model to the United 
States. Note that the data is for males.
Recall that the length of a period is calibrated to a year, and that model age zero corresponds to age 25 in the data. All 
agents enter the model in very good health and with zero assets. We assume an annual interest rate equal to 3%. Individuals 
differ with respect to education, health insurance coverage and their preference for leisure. We group individuals into two 
education categories, college and non-college, three health insurance categories, retiree, tied and none, and two disutility 
from work categories, low and high. This yields 12 types. The weights for the education and health insurance categories are 
taken from the data. The weights for the low and high disutility types are calibrated to match the retirement age distribu-
tion. In our sample, 42% of men have a college degree. Less than 10% of college educated men in the U.S. have no health 
insurance coverage, whereas roughly 20% of non-college educated men are without health insurance. Approximately 65% 
of men aged 55–64 have health insurance through their employer, with employer-based health insurance more prevalent 
among college educated men (85%) than non-college educated men (57%). Moreover, more than half of college educated 
men have retiree health insurance, whereas roughly a third of non-college educated men have retiree health insurance.10
3.1. Preference parameters
The preference parameters that need to be assigned a value are the discount factor, β , and the parameters governing the 
disutility from working, b(h, s). β is chosen to match an asset to income ratio of 3. The parameters governing the disutility 
from working are critical for matching the retirement age distribution. We assume two disutility from work types, low 
and high, and moreover allow the disutility from working to differ by health and education. Here we group the three best 
health categories into one, which we term ‘good’, and the two worst into one, which we term ‘bad’. This results in four 
disutility from work parameters for each educational type: low disutility and good health, low disutility and bad health, 
10 See Iams et al. (2008) and Johnson and Crystal (1997) for a more complete description of health insurance coverage by age, education and gender.
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match the employment rates of older men by education attainment. The target distribution is shown in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix.11
3.2. Life cycle earnings proﬁles
We use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)12 to construct life cycle earnings proﬁles for college and non-college edu-
cated workers in the United States.13 We limit the sample to men aged 25–62 working full-time. To trim outliers, we drop 
the top and bottom 1% of observations. The data is for year 2004. To construct the age-earnings proﬁles we regress labor 
income on age and age squared. This is done separately for the two education groups. We use the sample weights provided 
by LIS. The coeﬃcients of the earnings function are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Since we are dealing with cross-
sectional data, we need to be mindful of selection issues. This is particularly relevant at older ages. In light of this, we hold 
earnings above age 62 ﬁxed at the age 62 level.
3.3. Taxes
We follow Guvenen et al. (2014) in constructing the progressive tax function for the United States. The OECD tax database 
provides estimates of total labor income taxes for all income levels between half of average wage earnings (AW) and two 
times average wage earnings. The tax measures include income taxes (central government, local and state) and social se-
curity contributions, as well as many types of deductions. We use these estimates to calculate the average tax rate at 50%, 
75%, 100%, 125%, 150%, 175% and 200% of AW . We then ﬁt the following function to these data points: 
τy(y/AW) = a0 + a1(y/AW) + a2(y/AW)φ. (9)
The estimated parameter values are reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
Half of social security beneﬁts are counted toward total taxable income in the United States. Social security beneﬁts are 
exempt from tax when total taxable income is below $25,000. One is, thus, unlikely to pay tax on social security beneﬁts 
if social security beneﬁts are the only source of income. If, however, one continues to work while collecting social security 
beneﬁts, part of the social security beneﬁts may be taxable. One does not pay social security contributions on beneﬁts.
We take the consumption tax rates from McDaniel (2007).
The government uses the tax revenue to ﬁnance the social insurance programs. We assume that the leftover tax revenue 
is thrown away. This is equivalent to assuming that it is spent on government consumption, as long as the government 
consumption does not affect the marginal utility of private consumption.
3.4. Health expenditures
We parameterize the cost of health investment to match health expenditures. We assume one gross price per unit of 
health investment, but allow the net price paid by individuals to vary based on health insurance type and work status. 
Medicare coverage begins at age 65. Table A.4 in the Appendix reports average health expenditures by health insurance 
type and work status. These numbers are based on those reported by French and Jones (2011).14 Health expenditures are 
higher for individuals who do not work than for those that do. This is particularly true for those whose health insurance 
coverage is tied to working. Unsurprisingly, health expenditures are greatest for those without health insurance coverage. 
Conditional on not working, Medicare eligibility lowers average health expenditures.
3.5. Health and disability risk
We assume two health shocks, a small shock and a large shock. The small shock corresponds to a one unit drop in 
health, while the large shock corresponds to a three unit drop. Given that health investments take the value zero or one, 
and are not always effective, individuals can only partially insure against health shocks. The shock probabilities are health-
and age-dependent, with the probability of the shock greater the older the individual and the worse the health of the 
11 Since there is nothing in the model that could explain why some people never work, the employment and disability insurance rates are conditioned on 
everyone who is not on disability insurance working at age 50.
12 See LIS-Microdata (2015).
13 The choice of dataset is motivated by the fact that LIS is a harmonized cross-country dataset containing micro data on income for a large number of 
countries. Ideally we would have micro data on wages for all of the countries we study, but this would require us to examine several distinct micro datasets. 
That is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, given that we model a discrete labor supply choice, we feel that the earnings of full-time workers are a 
reasonable measure for our purposes.
14 We do not distinguish costs by health status or age (other than Medicare eligibility). When aggregating the numbers reported by French and Jones
(2011) we assume the weights for good and bad health reported in the OECD self-assessed health survey. We interpret bad health as corresponding to the 
two worst health states and good health as corresponding to the three best ones. The expenditure for those not eligible for Medicare is the expenditure 
reported for 64 year olds.
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Calibrated parameter values.
Parameter Value
Utility parameters
Discount factor 0.984
Interest rate 0.03
Disutility from work when:
non-college, health good and disutility type low 1.68
non-college, health bad and disutility type low 2.40
non-college, health good and disutility type high 2.85
non-college, health bad and disutility type high 3.60
college, health good and disutility type low 1.62
college, health bad and disutility type low 2.40
college, health good and disutility type high 2.46
college, health bad and disutility type high 3.60
DI parameters
Cost of applying for DI 0.3
Probability of getting DI if health bad 0.55
Probability of getting DI if health good and younger than 50 0.01
Probability of getting DI if health good and 50 or older 0.05
Health parameters
Decrease in health from low shock 1
Decrease in health from high shock 3
Probability of low shock, non-college 0.15 → 0.58
Probability of low shock, college 0.08→ 0.32
Probability of low shock when health very bad, non-college 0.58
Probability of low shock when health very bad, college 0.32
Probability of high shock 0.005
Probability of high shock when health very bad 0.1
Probability health investment effective when health good 0.9 → 0.5
Probability health investment effective when health bad 0.3 → 0.1
individual. The dependency of the shock on health status is intended to mimic the persistence of health shocks. We also 
allow the shock probabilities to differ based on educational attainment. This is intended to capture the worse health and 
higher disability incidence rate of non-college educated workers relative to their college educated counterparts. Similarly, 
the probability that health investments are effective is also age- and health-dependent. Speciﬁcally, the probability that 
investments are effective is lower the older the individual and the worse the health of the individual.
There are strict health criteria associated with disability insurance eligibility. But health is not perfectly observable, and 
as such the screening process is imperfect. Iyengar and Mastrobuoni (2014) estimate that roughly 40% of applications for 
social security disability insurance are granted, whereas Low and Pistaferri (2010) estimate it to be 53%. While there are no 
hard facts about the prevalence of type 1 and type 2 error associated with the awarding of disability beneﬁts, Benitez-Silva 
et al. (2004) estimate that approximately 22% of disability applicants who are awarded beneﬁts are not truly disabled. Low 
and Pistaferri (2010) estimate this to be around 10%. Conversely, Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) estimate that 58% of applicants 
who are denied beneﬁts are in fact disabled; Low and Pistaferri (2010) ﬁnd it to be 43% of applicants. To capture the type 
1 and type 2 error associated with the awarding of disability beneﬁts, we assume a probability of being awarded beneﬁts 
(conditional on applying) that is positive in all health states but greater the worse the health of the applicant. In order to 
talk about type 1 and type 2 error in the model, we must take a stand on what constitutes ‘truly disabled’ in the model. We 
interpret the two worst health states as disabled. Eligibility for disability insurance beneﬁts also requires that the individual 
is not working at the time of application. We impose a cost of applying for disability beneﬁts to capture lost earnings 
associated with applying for disability beneﬁts. The cost is proportional to earnings prior to the application for disability 
beneﬁts and incurred irrespective of whether the beneﬁts are granted.
We jointly calibrate (1) the probability process governing health shocks, (2) the probability process governing the effec-
tiveness of health investment, (3) the probability process governing the granting of disability beneﬁts, and (4) the cost of 
applying for disability beneﬁts to match: (1) the application rate for disability beneﬁts, (2) the prevalence of type 1 and 
type 2 error in the granting of disability beneﬁts, (3) the incidence of disability insurance claiming by age and education, 
and (4) the health distribution by age and education.
Table A.5 in the Appendix summarizes the prevalence of disability insurance claiming among older men by educational 
attainment, and Table A.6 reports the self-assessed health of older men for college and non-college educated workers re-
spectively. For ease of exposition, we again group the three best health categories into ‘good’ and the two worst into ‘bad’.
3.6. Calibrated economy
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values for the benchmark U.S. economy. In what follows we brieﬂy discuss 
some of the parameter values, as well as the ﬁt to the data.
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Table 2
Disability insurance incidence (%) by age and ed-
ucation: model vs. data.
Non-college
Age Model Data
50–54 4.7 8.7
55–59 7.9 10.0
60–64 11.9 11.2
College
Age Model Data
50–54 1.7 3.4
55–59 3.4 4.6
60–64 4.7 4.6
3.6.1. Employment and disability
We are particularly interested in how well we are able to replicate the labor supply behavior of older workers. Fig. 1
shows the employment rates of older men by age and education relative to the data. The calibration places 40% (55%) weight 
on the low disutility type and 60% (45%) weight on the high disutility type for the non-college (college) workers. The ﬁt of 
the model is good for the non-college types. In particular, the model is able to match the gradual decline in employment in 
the 50s, followed by the somewhat steeper decline in the 60s. The model ﬁt for the college types is not as good as for the 
non-college types, particularly in that the model predicts too high employment in the early 60s relative to the data, but the 
ﬁt is nevertheless quite good.
There are substantial differences in retirement behavior based on health insurance coverage. Our model predicts that 
individuals with retiree health insurance stop working on average almost a year earlier than those with tied health insurance 
coverage. Individuals with tied health insurance in turn stop working on average slightly more than a year before those with 
no health insurance. These patterns are in line with the ﬁndings of French and Jones (2011).
Table 2 reports disability insurance claiming by age and educational attainment. The model predicts that disability insur-
ance claiming occurs a bit later than it does in the data. Nevertheless, the model does a relatively good job of matching the 
incidence of disability insurance claiming.
The calibration implies a cost of applying for disability insurance equal to 30% of labor earnings in the period in which 
the individual applies for disability beneﬁts. This value seems reasonable given the fact that in the U.S. disability insurance 
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Health distribution (%) by age and education: 
model vs. data.
Non-college
Age Health Data Model
60–64 Good 69.2 87.3
60–64 Bad 30.8 12.7
70–74 Good 64.8 69.6
70–74 Bad 35.2 30.4
College
Age Health Data Model
60–64 Good 89.1 95.3
60–64 Bad 10.9 4.7
70–74 Good 85.4 90.7
70–74 Bad 14.6 9.3
applicants are required to have a period of 6 months of no work prior to applying for beneﬁts. In the calibration, the prob-
ability of being awarded disability insurance beneﬁts when in the two worst health states is 0.55, whereas the probability 
in all other health states is 0.01 when younger than 50 and 0.05 otherwise. This results in an acceptance rate of 32.3%. 
Moreover, our model predicts that 7.2% of disability insurance claimants are not truly disabled (i.e., in very good, good or 
fair health), whereas 36.1% of those denied beneﬁts are in fact disabled. The acceptance rate and the prevalence of type 1 
and 2 error are a bit lower than the estimates of Low and Pistaferri (2010) and Benitez-Silva et al. (2004), but nevertheless 
in a reasonable range.
3.6.2. Savings
Savings in the model is governed by the discount rate β , which is chosen to match an assets to income ratio of 3. In the 
calibration we reach an assets to income ratio of 2.98.
3.6.3. Health
One dimension along which the model struggles a little bit is in matching the health distribution at older ages. As is 
evident from Table 3, in the age group 60–64 the model somewhat over predicts the share of healthy individuals. By age 
70–74, this largely corrects itself and the ﬁt to the data is quite good.
This ﬁt to the data is achieved by assuming that the probability of being hit by the small health shock increases linearly 
with age. In the calibration it rises from 0.15 to 0.58 for the non-college types and from 0.08 to 0.32 for the college types 
over the life cycle. However, if the individual is in the worst health state, the probability of being hit by the small shock is 
0.58 for the non-college educated worker and 0.32 for the college educated worker, regardless of age. We assume that the 
probability of being hit by the big health shock is only dependent on health. Speciﬁcally, the probability is 0.005 in the four 
best health states and 0.1 in the worst health state. As noted previously, the dependency of the shock probability on health 
status mimics persistence.
The probability that the health investment is effective is also dependent on age and health. We assume that, given a 
particular level of health, the probability that health investment is effective decreases linearly with age. A decline in health, 
however, shifts the probabilities to a lower trajectory. Here we group the three best health states into one (good) and the 
two worst into one (bad). Table 1 reports the boundary values for the two health states.
There is some tension in matching the data on disability insurance incidence, health and the moments pertaining to the 
granting of disability beneﬁts. This could well be due to either measurement issues with the self-reported health data or 
with the measurement of type 1 and 2 error associated with the granting of disability beneﬁts.
3.6.4. Employment by health
One metric that we have not explicitly targeted is employment by health status. Given that the only source of uncer-
tainty in the model is health risk, one might be concerned that health shocks play too large a role in driving retirement 
behavior. This is not the case. In fact, our model slightly understates the role of health shocks in retirement transitions. 
Blau and Shvydko (2011) document that 13% of the transitions from employment to retirement among individuals aged 
52–71 are associated with a change in self-reported health status from good to bad, whereas the majority of individuals, 
69%, report being in good health both before and after the transition into retirement. In our model, 9.5% of the transitions 
from employment to retirement are associated with a decline in health from good to bad and 81.4% agents in the model are 
in good health before and after the transition to retirement. Upon reﬂection, this is not that surprising, since individuals in 
our model are a bit too healthy relative to the data.15
15 Good health is again deﬁned as the three best health states and bad health as the two worst.
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Program rules.
Denmark Netherlands Spain Sweden France
Old-age
Eligibility age 65 occ. 55 earn. dep. 60 61 60
67 ﬂat-rate 65 ﬂat-rate
Full retirement n/a 65 65 65 40 years of 
work
Must stop work yes yes yes no yes
Flat-rate $13100 $12200 no $4150 no
Earnings 
dependent
max $2600 
(depends on yrs.)
70% of ave. >
40% of ave.
depends on yrs of 
work
60% of ave. 
(15 best yrs) 
+ occ. pen.
50% of ave. 
(25 best yrs) 
+ occ. pen.
Early claiming 
reduction
n/a depends on 
age
depends on yrs of 
work
0.5% per month 5% per year
DI
Flat-rate $19850 no no same as regular no
Earnings 
dependent
n/a 70% of ave. similar to regular 
(depends on age)
same as regular 
(as if work to 65)
50% of ave. 
(10 best years)
Germany U.K. Canada Australia U.S.
Old-age
Eligibility age 63 65 60 earn. dep. 55 earn. dep. 62
65 ﬂat-rate 65 ﬂat-rate
Full retirement 65 65 65 65 65
Must stop work yes no yes, if collect 
earn.
yes, if collect earn. no
dep. before 65 dep. before 65
Flat-rate no $6400 $4700 $8800 no
Earnings 
dependent
depends on 
relative earnings
25% of ave. 
(20 best yrs)
25% of ave. (drop 
lowest 15%)
accrue 9% per year piece-wise lin. 
(35 best yrs)
Early claiming 
reduction
0.3% per month n/a 0.5% per month no for earn. dep. 
n/a for ﬂat-rate
0.56% per 
month
DI
Flat-rate no $5900 $3800 $8800 no
Earnings 
dependent
same as regular 
(as if work to 60)
no 75% of regular 
earn. dep. portion
no similar to 
regular
4. Quantitative analysis
Having developed and calibrated the model, we turn to the policy analysis. Our goal is to quantify the role of social 
insurance programs in accounting for the cross-country differences in the labor supply behavior of older workers.
As documented previously, there are large differences in labor supply across countries. The differences are particularly 
pronounced at older ages. The employment rates of people aged 50–54 in all of the countries under study, namely Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the U.K., are similar to the United States. However, 
by age 60–64, the differences grow large. The employment rates of people aged 60–64 in France, Germany and the Nether-
lands are 26%, 56% and 57% of the U.S. level, respectively. The employment rates in Australia, Canada, Denmark and Spain 
are noticeably higher at 88%, 89%, 88% and 83% of the U.S. level, respectively. The U.K. reports an employment rate similar 
to the U.S., at 98% of the U.S. level and Sweden an even higher employment rate at 110% of the U.S. level.
Similarly, there are sizable cross-country differences in the claiming of disability insurance beneﬁts. France, Germany 
and Canada report low rates of disability insurance incidence, with below 6% of the population aged 50–64 claiming dis-
ability beneﬁts. Conversely, the U.S., the U.K., Spain and Australia exhibit intermediate rates of disability insurance incidence 
with between 6% and 11% the population aged 50–64 claiming beneﬁts. Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have high 
rates of disability insurance incidence with between 13% and 16% of the population aged 50–64 claiming disability bene-
ﬁts.
Simultaneously, we observe big cross-country differences in social security programs. Table 4 summarizes the key fea-
tures of the old-age pension and disability insurance programs in place in the countries under study.16 A more detailed 
description of the programs can be found in the Appendix. At one end of the spectrum lie France, Spain and the Nether-
lands, where old-age pension beneﬁts are generous and one can claim them at a rather young age. Canada, Australia, the 
U.K. and Denmark are at the opposite end of the spectrum, with considerably more modest beneﬁt levels. Germany and 
Sweden are intermediate cases in terms of the generosity of old-age pension beneﬁts. In the majority of the continental 
16 Source: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/.
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very generous in Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands, and to a slightly lesser degree also in Denmark.
All the European countries, as well as Canada and Australia have a public healthcare system. This is quite different from 
the U.S., where expected health expenditures differ greatly based on health insurance status. As a result, health insurance 
coverage can be a big incentive for continued employment in the United States. We capture the public healthcare systems 
in a very stylized way, by assuming a subsidy on health expenditures. We assume one price per unit of health investment 
within a country, but vary this price across countries so that average health expenditures in the model match average per 
capita health expenditures in the data for each country in question. The subsidy on health expenditures is set to match 
the share of public health expenditures in the country in question. Table A.7 in the Appendix reports average per capita 
health expenditures as well as the public share of all health expenditures. Per capita health expenditures range from roughly 
$2500 in Spain to roughly $4200 in the Netherlands. The public share of health expenditures is large in all of the European 
countries as well as in Australia and Canada. It ranges from roughly 68% in Australia to approximately 85% in Denmark.
There is considerable variation in the taxation of labor income across countries, both in terms of average levels and in 
the progressivity of taxation. We use the same method for constructing progressive tax functions for all of the countries in 
our study that we did for the United States. The parameters of the tax functions are reported in Table A.3 the Appendix. The 
tax functions for Canada, Australia and the U.K. are similar to that in the United States. The tax functions for the Northern 
European countries exhibit the highest degree of progressivity and also the highest average rates. The tax functions for the 
continental European countries lie in between the two extremes.
In our policy analysis, we take great care in accurately modeling the details of the old-age pension and disability in-
surance programs across countries, including entitlement ages, dependence on income, adjustments for early claiming, 
restrictions associated with work when collecting beneﬁts and the taxation of beneﬁts. For an illustration of how the 
country speciﬁc program rules in Table 4 are mapped to the model, see the Appendix. We vary the tax schedules and the 
health costs across countries, as outlined above. We set the share of college educated workers in each country to match 
the share in our sample from the LIS dataset. The parameters governing the disutility of working and the health process 
are kept at the benchmark U.S. level. Similarly, the cost of applying for disability insurance beneﬁts and the probabilities of 
being awarded beneﬁts (conditional on health status) are kept at the U.S. level for now, although we revisit this assumption 
later. In our benchmark speciﬁcation we keep the labor earnings proﬁles ﬁxed across countries. Subsequently we study the 
effect of also varying earnings proﬁles across countries.
4.1. Results
In Table 5, we present results from three related policy exercises. The ﬁrst policy exercise, referred to as Model 1 in 
the table, is to modify the old-age pension and disability insurance programs to reﬂect those in place in Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. in turn. The tax schedules are also set to the 
country speciﬁc ones. As noted previously, all other parameters are kept at the benchmark U.S. values. The second exercise, 
Model 2, encompasses the ﬁrst exercise but has the additional feature of modeling the country speciﬁc health costs. Lastly, 
our third exercise, Model 3, encompasses Model 2 with the additional feature of varying earnings proﬁles across countries 
(for the countries where data is available in the LIS database). In essence, we are asking what would happen if the U.S. were 
to implement the social insurance programs in place in, for example, France, or alternatively Australia. We then compare 
this to the actual observations from these countries in order to understand the role various institutional features play in 
accounting for the differing labor supply outcomes.
4.1.1. Country-speciﬁc old-age pension and disability insurance
Let us now turn to the ﬁrst set of results. The pension and disability insurance programs in place in the OECD countries 
under study create very different incentives for the labor supply behavior of older workers. The model predicts high em-
ployment rates for older workers with the old-age pension and disability insurance programs in place in Canada, Australia, 
the U.K. and Germany. The model predicted employment rates for these economies are similar to or even higher than the 
corresponding values for the benchmark U.S. economy. The model also predicts low disability insurance claiming rates for 
the four aforementioned countries. Conversely, the model predicted employment rates for older workers under the pension 
and disability insurance programs in place in France, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark are considerably lower, 
particularly among people aged 65 and above. The model predicts high disability insurance claiming rates for Spain and the 
Netherlands.
4.1.2. Country-speciﬁc health insurance
Recall that Model 1 assumes the health expenditure structure of the U.S. benchmark economy. In the benchmark U.S. 
economy, there is an incentive for the workers with either tied health insurance coverage or no health insurance coverage 
to continue working until age 65, when they become eligible for Medicare. With public healthcare, this motive is absent. 
17 One can earn a small amount while collecting social security in some of the countries, but the limit is tight enough to result in the same behavior as 
if one were required to stop working to collect social security beneﬁts.
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Employment and disability incidence across countries: 
model vs. data. Data source: OECD, 2003.
Country Employment DI
55–59 60–64 65–69 50–64
Spain
Model 1 72.3 53.5 6.9 24.3
Model 2 68.8 31.9 5.9 27.3
Model 3 73.2 39.9 7.1 23.1
Data 77.5 49.9 6.0 8.4
France
Model 1 93.2 0 0 6.4
Model 2 93.2 0 0 6.4
Data 67.9 16.2 4.3 4.4
Sweden
Model 1 87.6 60.4 21.8 10.0
Model 2 71.9 36.2 9.7 15.4
Data 79.3 59.9 16.4 14.7
Denmark
Model 1 93.3 89.3 19.9 6.9
Model 2 89.3 47.8 15.2 10.6
Model 3 74.1 45.0 15.2 13.0
Data 79.3 59.9 16.4 14.7
Netherlands
Model 1 77.9 67.7 0 19.8
Model 2 38.7 35.2 0 27.1
Model 3 47.5 45.9 0 25.9
Data 73.4 31.1 10.3 13.0
Germany
Model 1 93.8 75.6 31.3 6.0
Model 2 93.4 71.4 24.0 6.5
Model 3 93.5 71.8 24.2 6.3
Data 78.3 34.8 8.2 5.5
U.K.
Model 1 96.6 85.5 45.5 2.9
Model 2 88.1 48.1 42.0 3.3
Data 79.0 57.0 18.7 10.3
Canada
Model 1 97.0 58.4 48.0 2.7
Model 2 92.0 47.6 45.8 3.5
Model 3 86.3 45.9 43.6 4.8
Data 80.0 55.0 22.9 5.7
Australia
Model 1 96.2 88.6 38.7 3.3
Model 2 95.7 48.5 25.9 3.8
Data 76.2 51.9 21.4 10.8
Model 2 encompasses Model 1, but with the addition of public health insurance, captured through country speciﬁc subsidy 
rates on health expenditures. The model predicts a decline in employment rates of older workers in all of the countries 
under study following the introduction of public health insurance. Disability insurance incidence also rises. Comparing the 
model predictions to the data, we note that, despite the dampening effect of public health insurance, the model predicted 
employment rates for older workers in Canada, the U.K. and Germany are somewhat too high relative to the data.18 In 
Canada and the U.K. this is particularly true of workers aged 65 and above. The model predicted disability incidence rates 
are also too low for the U.K. and Canada. The over-predicted employment rates in Germany may be due to the fact that 
unemployment, a channel absent from our model, is an important pathway to early retirement in Germany. Conversely, 
the model predicted employment rates for Spain, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands are somewhat too low relative 
to the data. For Spain, Sweden and Denmark this is particularly true above age 60, whereas in the Netherlands the model 
under-predicts employment already in the 55–59 age bin. For the cases of Spain and the Netherlands the low predicted 
employment is largely due to over-predicted disability insurance incidence rates. The model predicted employment rates for 
France and Australia are more in line with the data, although the model predicted disability incidence rate is somewhat 
too high for France, and conversely too low for Australia. The model captures the strong incentive for retirement at age 
60 under the French pension scheme. This effect is a bit overstated by the model though, resulting in too low predicted 
employment above age 60.
18 Again, the data on employment and disability insurance rates are conditioned on everyone who is not on disability insurance working at age 50.
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So far we have assumed the U.S. earnings proﬁle for all countries. Several authors have documented that the life cycle 
proﬁles for wages/earnings differ substantially across countries (see Guvenen et al., 2014 and Lagakos et al., 2012). This has 
potential implications for how attractive pension and disability insurance programs appear across countries. Moreover, there 
is potential interaction between the earnings proﬁle and the details of the pension system. One example of this is that the 
number of years on which the pension beneﬁt is based differs substantially across countries. To address these concerns, 
we include results from an exercise where we also vary earnings proﬁles across countries. We label this Model 3. Of the 
countries in our sample, the LIS dataset includes the necessary variables to construct life cycle earnings proﬁles for Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. The earnings proﬁles for these countries are constructed in the same way 
as for the U.S.; the coeﬃcients of the earnings functions are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. We chose not to limit 
our sample to these ﬁve countries, as doing so would eliminate some of the interesting cross-country variation in social 
insurance schemes. As seen from Table 5, the model predicted employment rates for Spain, the Netherlands and Germany 
are slightly higher with the country speciﬁc earnings proﬁles than with the U.S. earnings proﬁles. Conversely, the model 
predicted employment rates for Denmark and Canada are slightly lower with the country speciﬁc earnings proﬁles than 
with the U.S. earnings proﬁles. All in all, the effect of varying earnings proﬁles across countries is relatively small and does 
not alter our main ﬁndings.
4.1.4. Summary of results
From the model it is clear that there are large incentives for early retirement built into the social insurance systems 
in place in France, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. With the exception of France, the incentives for early 
retirement in these countries arise in large part from the generous disability insurance schemes. In France, the old-age 
pension scheme creates strong incentives for early retirement. Conversely, less generous social security programs encourage 
older workers to remain employed in the U.K., Canada, Australia and Germany. In fact, the differences in social insurance 
across countries are so substantial that our model predicts even more variation in employment rates across countries than 
observed in the data. This suggests that something outside our model dampens these effects. The puzzle is not so much, 
why do Europeans work less than Americans, but rather, given the institutional incentives they face, why some Europeans 
work as much as they do. This result is similar in spirit to that of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), who ﬁnd it hard to 
reconcile generous unemployment insurance beneﬁts with the observed employment rates in Europe. 
4.2. Discussion
In this section we discuss some of our modeling choices and how robust our results are to these assumptions. We also 
provide some intuition for our results. 
4.2.1. Uses for tax revenue
Following Rogerson (2007) and Ragan (2013), we know that what the government does with the tax revenue matters for 
labor supply responses. Recall that we assume that the tax revenue left over after ﬁnancing old-age pensions and disability 
insurance is thrown away. This is equivalent to assuming that the revenue is used to ﬁnance government consumption, 
which does not affect the marginal utility of private consumption. This is a reasonable assumption for at least a share of the 
remaining tax revenue. There are, however, tax and transfer programs in addition to the social insurance schemes modeled 
here that have potentially large effects for labor supply decisions. For example, Rogerson (2007) and Ragan (2013) stress 
that governmental subsidies to childcare and elderly care boost employment in the Scandinavian countries. These programs 
are, however, more likely to impact prime-aged workers than older workers. It is nevertheless potentially interesting to 
study alternative uses for the remaining tax revenue. Our approach can be thought of as a starting point for future analysis.
4.2.2. Discrete labor supply
Our model assumes a discrete labor supply choice, individuals either work full-time or not at all. Fig. A.1 in the Appendix 
illustrates that roughly 77% of 50–54 year old men in the U.S. are working 1750 or more hours annually, whereas approx-
imately 12% are not working at all. By age 70–74, only about 11% work in excess of 1750 hours, while almost 75% report 
working zero hours. This implies that the prevalent transition in the data as people age is from full-time work to little or 
no work. Part-time work among men in the U.S. is very limited in scope at all ages, irrespective of whether part-time work 
is deﬁned as working less than 1750 hours annually (35 hours per week) or as working less than 1500 hours annually 
(30 hours per week). By studying individual level panel data from the PSID, Rogerson and Wallenius (2013) demonstrate 
that the prominent transition from full-time work to no work is indeed an abrupt one.
The lack of a part-time work option could, however, contribute to the model’s over-prediction of the variation in employ-
ment rates across countries. Table A.8 in the Appendix reports the prevalence of part-time work among men by age across 
our sample of OECD countries.19 The incidence of part-time work among men is very limited in scope in all of the countries 
under study, although it does appear to rise slightly with age in some countries. While abstracting from a part-time work 
option is not entirely innocuous, it seems unlikely to be driving our results.
19 The OECD classiﬁes less than 30 hours per week as part-time work. Canada and Australia do not report values for 65–69 and 70–74 year olds separately, 
only for 65+.
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values result in either no changes or alternatively large changes in labor supply. We have conducted some sensitivity analysis 
with respect to the calibration. There are several similar parameterizations that give almost as good of a ﬁt as our chosen 
speciﬁcation. The labor supply responses across the various policy experiments are similar with the slightly perturbed 
parameter values that we have experimented with. Nevertheless, an inherent feature of a model with a discrete labor supply 
choice is that the labor supply responses to policy changes may be larger than with a continuous labor supply choice. We 
would, however, argue that given the limited scope of part-time work among men, the retirement decision appears well 
approximated by a discrete choice.
4.2.3. Income and employment risk
Given that the only source of uncertainty in the model is health risk, one might be concerned that health shocks play 
too large a role in driving retirement behavior. In the Calibration Section, we demonstrated that this is actually not the 
case. In our model, less than 10% of the transitions from employment to retirement are associated with a decline in health 
from good to bad, compared with roughly 13% in the data. A potential concern, however, is that our calibrated disutility 
parameters may be inﬂuenced by the fact that we are abstracting from income or employment risk. See, e.g., Low et al.
(2010), French (2005) and Erosa et al. (2012) for a discussion of the effect of income and employment risk on precautionary 
savings and retirement. On a related note, unemployment is a potential channel into early retirement that we abstract from. 
This could be one reason our model over-predicts employment in Germany, since unemployment is a prevalent channel into 
retirement in Germany.
4.2.4. Disability
As previously documented, we observe big cross-country differences in the prevalence of disability insurance claiming. 
This is not so surprising, considering how much the incentives for disability insurance claiming differ across countries. 
However, our model predicts even more variation in the disability incidence rates than we see in the data. In particular, the 
model predicts much higher disability insurance claiming rates for Spain and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent also for 
France, than we observe in the data. Conversely the model predicts too low disability incidence in the U.K. and Australia. To 
gain intuition for this result, it is perhaps interesting to evaluate some of our model assumptions. Recall that our analysis 
assumed that the cost of applying for disability insurance beneﬁts and the probability of being awarded beneﬁts (conditional 
on health) are the same for all countries. Moreover, we also assumed that preferences and the process governing shocks to 
health are the same across countries. As an illustration, let us consider the European countries of Spain, the Netherlands 
and France for which our model over-predicts disability incidence. Potential explanations for why our model over-predicts 
disability insurance claiming in these countries include: (1) the application cost for disability insurance beneﬁts is higher 
in Europe than in the U.S., (2) the probability of being granted disability insurance beneﬁts is lower in Europe than in the 
U.S., (3) Europeans have a lower disutility for work than their American counterparts or (4) Europeans are healthier or live 
longer than their American counterparts. In what follows we explore these alternative explanations.
While a longer life span has qualitatively the correct effect on employment and disability incidence rates, this explanation 
does not seem quantitatively plausible. A deterministic increase in the length of life of as much as ﬁve years has only a 
negligible effect on both employment and disability insurance incidence.
The notion that Europeans would have a lower disutility for work than their American counterparts seems implausi-
ble, given other cross-country observations regarding labor supply patterns, namely vacation days, holidays, sick time and 
workweek length.
As one would expect, raising the application cost of disability insurance beneﬁts lowers disability incidence. The appli-
cation cost would need to be raised from 30% to close to 50% to bring model predicted disability incidence rates down to 
the levels observed in the Netherlands, and to around 44% to bring the rates down to the levels observed in Spain. Even 
a cost of 100% of income in the application period is, however, not quite enough to bring down the disability incidence 
rates to levels observed in France. Note that in the U.S. applicants for disability beneﬁts are required to have a six-month 
period of no work before applying for beneﬁts, while in Europe applicants are not. Our ﬁndings would therefore suggest 
that the non-monetary component of application costs (e.g., social stigma, bureaucracy, etc.) would need to be much higher 
in Europe than in the United States in order for differences in application costs to rationalize the discrepancy between 
disability rates predicted by the model and those observed in the data. This is supported by Lindbeck (1995) and Lindbeck 
and Nyberg (2006) who argue that generous welfare policies are only possible with strong social norms favoring work. The 
authors do caution, however, that such norms erode over time as more and more people start collecting social assistance.
In the baseline model the probability of being awarded disability insurance beneﬁts when in good health and age 50 or 
older is 5%. Lowering this probability to around 3.5% brings the model predicted disability incidence rates close to those 
observed in Spain and the Netherlands. However, to lower the disability incidence rates under the French regime to the 
levels observed in the data one needs to also lower the probability of being granted disability beneﬁts when sick. This 
implies a substantially tighter screening of disability insurance applicants in the aforementioned European countries relative 
to the United States. It should also be noted that, at least in the Netherlands (and Sweden), disability insurance beneﬁts 
have also been awarded for labor market reasons since the 1970s (see Aarts and de Jong, 2014), although some countries 
have implemented more stringent screening policies recently (see, e.g., Johansson et al., 2014). All in all, it remains a bit 
of a puzzle why some Europeans work as much as they do, given the generous social insurance programs in place in the 
countries in question.
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We observe large cross-country differences in employment rates; these differences are particularly pronounced at older 
ages. In this paper we develop a life cycle model of labor supply and health to study the role of social insurance, namely 
old-age pensions, disability insurance and health insurance, in accounting for these differences across OECD countries.
Our model features heterogeneous agents, who differ with respect to educational attainment, health insurance coverage 
and their preference for leisure. Individuals choose when to stop working and when/if to apply for old-age pension and 
disability insurance beneﬁts. The granting of disability insurance beneﬁts (conditional on applying) is imperfectly correlated 
with health. This implies that, in equilibrium, some healthy individuals will be granted beneﬁts, while some sick individuals 
will in fact be denied beneﬁts. Agents can partially insure against health shocks by investing in health. Health expenditures 
differ by health insurance status. We calibrate the model to the U.S., and then modify the retirement and health insurance 
systems to reﬂect those in place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
U.K. in turn.
Older workers face very different incentives for continued employment in the OECD countries under study. We ﬁnd that 
generous social insurance programs create incentives for early retirement in France, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Denmark. With the exception of France, this is to a substantial degree driven by generous disability insurance schemes. 
Conversely, the model predicts high employment rates of older workers for Australia, Canada, the U.K. and Germany. The 
existence of public health insurance depresses labor supply in all of the countries under study. Despite this dampening 
effect, the model predicted employment rates for older workers in Canada, the U.K. and Germany are somewhat too high 
relative to the data. On the contrary, the model predicts somewhat too low employment of older workers in Spain, Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. The model predicted employment rates for France and Australia are more in line with the 
data. Given our ﬁndings, the puzzle is not, why do Europeans work so much less than Americans, but why, given the 
incentives built into the social insurance programs in place, do some Europeans work as much as they do. Moreover, viewed 
through the same lens, it is equally puzzling why people in Canada and the U.K. do not work more than they do.
Appendix A. Data
Table A.1
Employment rates of men (%) by age and education. 
Data source: HRS, 2004.
Age Non-college College
50–54 91.3 96.6
55–59 85.2 92.2
60–64 63.6 71.7
65–69 37.4 53.8
70–74 25.4 34.9
Table A.2
Coeﬃcients of earnings functions.
Country Non-college College
Age Age2 Const. Age Age2 Const.
Canada 1731.6 −17.7 −4669.5 2833.9 −28.8 −19582.0
Denmark 1482.2 −16.0 7627.7 3154.2 −32.7 −19988.4
Germany 1223.5 −10.2 5847.5 3575.6 −34.3 −32192.0
Netherlands 1931.8 −19.1 −6748.8 4406.7 −41.2 −52838.7
Spain 861.6 −8.3 4678.9 1961.5 −17.1 −11967.4
U.S. 1858.8 −16.9 −6069.3 5840.7 −59.1 −67737.6
Table A.3
Coeﬃcients of tax functions.
Country a0 a1 a2 φ
Australia 0.134 0.106 0 −9.450
Canada 0.273 0.020 −0.053 −1.371
Denmark 15.297 0.052 −14.940 −0.006
France 0.240 0.050 −0.004 −4.325
Germany 10.180 −0.101 −9.655 −0.025
Netherlands 0.266 0.069 0 −14.347
Spain 0.188 0.044 −0.030 −1.820
Sweden 7.210 0.118 −7.002 0.003
U.K. 0.204 0.059 0 −11.787
U.S. 7.467 0.031 −7.248 −0.008
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Average health expenditures by health insurance coverage and work status. Based 
on French and Jones (2011).
Medicare Retiree 
working
Retiree not 
working
Tied 
working
Tied not 
working
None
No $3391 $4165 $3603 $5806 $6448
Yes $3563 $3950 $4109 $4539 $5214
Table A.5
Disability insurance incidence of older men (%) by 
educational attainment. Data source: HRS, 2004.
Age Non-college College
50–54 8.7 3.4
55–59 10.0 4.6
60–64 11.2 4.6
Table A.6
Self-assessed health of older men (%) by educa-
tional attainment. Data source: HRS, 2004.
Non-college
Age Good Bad
50–54 68.8 31.2
55–59 70.6 29.4
60–64 69.2 30.8
65–69 68.5 31.5
70–74 64.8 35.2
College
Age Good Bad
50–54 90.3 9.7
55–59 89.0 11.0
60–64 89.1 10.9
65–69 84.1 15.9
70–74 85.4 14.6
Table A.7
Health expenditure around the world. Data source: OECD, 2008.
Country Per capita health 
expenditure ($)
Public share of health 
expenditure (%)
Australia 3231 67.9
Canada 3691 70.5
Denmark 3475 84.7
France 3313 77.3
Germany 3621 76.4
Netherlands 4188 74.7
Spain 2509 73.0
Sweden 3165 81.5
UK 3007 81.4
Table A.8
Prevalence of male part-time work (%) across countries by age. Data source: OECD, 2007.
Country/age 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 65+
Australia 5.7 7.3 10.5 . . 5.0
Canada 3.8 5.7 8.1 . . 4.6
Denmark 4.9 4.4 6.5 7.6 6.1 .
France 3.7 3.7 2.2 1.3 0.7 .
Germany 4.1 4.7 5.6 4.8 2.8 .
Netherlands 6.4 10.1 13.0 10.6 6.6 .
Spain 1.3 1.3 2.5 1.2 0.8 .
Sweden 4.4 5.9 11.0 10.0 7.2 .
U.K. 4.0 6.9 10.3 10.1 5.0 .
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Appendix B. Details of social security programs
Below we summarize the salient features of the social security programs in place in the countries under study. There 
have been changes to the systems over time; the programs outlined here are those in place in year 2004 (all amounts are 
in 2004 USD, PPP adjusted).
B.1. Australia
In Australia, the old-age pension beneﬁt is comprised of two components, a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt and a mandatory occupa-
tional pension. The ﬂat-rate beneﬁt equals $8810 per year, and it is awarded at age 65. One is not required to stop working 
to collect the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt. Occupational pension accrual is 9% of earnings per year (paid out as annuity). The occupa-
tional pension can be claimed starting at age 55. However, if one claims before age 65, one is required to stop working. 
Disability insurance beneﬁts are ﬂat-rate and equal in size to the old-age pension beneﬁt. There is no provision for disability 
in the occupational pension. Flat-rate beneﬁts are not taxed, as long as the individual does not earn income in excess of 
$16705 per year. Occupational pensions are taxable income.
B.2. Canada
In Canada, the old-age pension beneﬁt is comprised of two components, a universal pension (ﬂat-rate) and an earnings 
related pension. The universal pension is awarded at age 65 and equals roughly $4653 annually. One is not required to stop 
working in order to collect the universal pension. The earnings related pension can be claimed starting at age 60. However, 
if one claims before age 65, one is required to stop working. The earnings related pension equals 25% of average lifetime 
earnings (with 15% of the lowest years of earnings dropped). The pension is reduced by 0.5% per month for each month in 
which beneﬁts are received prior to reaching the full-retirement age of 65. Similarly, there is an increase of 0.5% per month 
for deferred claiming up to age 70. The maximum earnings dependent beneﬁt is roughly $8085 annually. The disability 
beneﬁt equals $3792 per year plus 75% of the earnings related pension. Beneﬁts are taxable income.
B.3. Denmark
In Denmark, the old-age pension beneﬁt is comprised of two components, a universal pension (ﬂat-rate) and a mandatory 
occupational pension. The universal pension is awarded at age 67 and equals roughly $13 086. The universal pension is 
reduced if the individual works. The occupational pension depends solely on hours and years worked, not on earnings. The 
maximum annual occupational pension for someone with a full contribution history (40 years working full-time) is $2619. 
The occupational pension is awarded at age 65. The disability beneﬁt equals roughly $19 850. Beneﬁts are taxable income.
T. Laun, J. Wallenius / Review of Economic Dynamics 22 (2016) 72–92 89B.4. France
The French pension system has two tiers: an earnings related public pension and a mandatory occupational pension. 
The maximum public pension beneﬁt is awarded with 40 years of contributions, but before 2003 it was granted with 
37.5 years of contributions. We assume that a non-college individual can receive a full pension at age 60, while a college 
individual can receive a full pension at age 63. The full beneﬁt equals 50% of average income from the 25 best years. The 
ﬁrst age at which the beneﬁt can be claimed is 60. However, the beneﬁt is reduced by 5% per year for each missing year 
of contributions. One is required to stop working to collect beneﬁts. Disability insurance can be claimed up to age 60. 
The disability beneﬁt equals 50% of the average wage from the best 10 years. The occupational pension scheme that we 
model applies to workers in the private sector (this is also what Erosa et al., 2012 model). The normal retirement age 
is 65 and there is a quasi-actuarial adjustment for early retirement (full retirement pension is possible with 37.5 years 
of contributions). The pension is calculated based on a point system. The contribution rate is 6% of average earnings on 
earnings below the economy’s average earnings, and 16% above the average (up to three times the economy’s average). 
The number of points earned in a particular year are computed by dividing the contributions by the cost of the pension 
point that year ($14.33). The total accumulated points are multiplied by the point value ($1.24) to compute the occupational 
pension beneﬁt. Beneﬁts are taxable income.
B.5. Germany
In Germany, the full-retirement age is 65, but it is possible to start claiming old-age pension beneﬁts at age 63 (if 
the worker has 35 years of contributions). Beneﬁts are tied to average lifetime earnings, as well as the relative earnings 
position of the individual. So called total earnings points are computed by taking individual annual earnings in each year, 
dividing them by average earnings in the economy in that year and then summing up over all years. To compute the beneﬁt, 
one then multiplies total earnings points by the pension value. The pension value in 2004 was roughly $350. Beneﬁts are 
reduced by 0.3% per month for every month that pension beneﬁts are collected prior to reaching the full-retirement age 
of 65. The increase in beneﬁts from deferred retirement is 0.5% for every month after age 65. One can only earn a small 
amount, approximately $385 per month, while collecting pension beneﬁts. The disability insurance beneﬁt is computed in 
the same manner as the old-age pension beneﬁt, with the exception that if disability occurs before age 60, the period from 
the beginning of the reduction in earning capacity up to age 60 is taken fully into account for the purpose of calculating 
the pension. The beneﬁt is reduced by 0.3% for every month a pension is drawn before age 63. Beneﬁts are not taxed (after 
2005, taxes phased in).
B.6. Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the old-age pension beneﬁt is comprised of two components, a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt and a mandatory 
occupational pension. The ﬂat-rate beneﬁt equals $12 162 per year, and it is awarded at age 65. Occupational pensions 
are based on the lifetime average earnings of the individual. The replacement rate is 70% and beneﬁts are reduced by a 
franchise amount which varies with the pension fund. We follow Erosa et al. (2012) and assume a franchise of 40% of 
average earnings, which is the value that applies for most workers. The franchise serves as a threshold in the calculation 
of the occupational pension beneﬁts. Individuals only build occupational pension if their earnings exceeds the franchise. 
In this way pension funds take into account the ﬂat-rate pension that individuals receive. Early retirement schemes allow 
individuals to retire before age 65. The replacement rate determining the early retirement pension depends on the age of 
the individual at retirement and equals 0.7 for ages 61–64, 0.55 for age 60, 0.45 for age 59, 0.38 for age 58, 0.32 for age 57, 
0.28 for age 56, and 0.25 for age 55. One must stop working to collect occupational pension. Disability beneﬁts replace 70% 
of lost earnings. Beneﬁts are taxable income.
B.7. Spain
The Spanish public pension system is organized in three regimes: the General Regime, the Special Regimes (for a few 
occupations), and the Regime for Civil Servants. We follow Erosa et al. (2012) and model the General Regime, which applies 
to more than 70% of workers. The full-retirement age is 65, but the ﬁrst age at which one can claim beneﬁts is 60. The 
old-age pension beneﬁt is based on average income from the last 15 years (called the beneﬁt base). Contributions to the 
pension system are capped at 1.64 times the average earnings in the economy. Pension accrual is as follows: 50% of the 
beneﬁt base for the ﬁrst 15 years of contributions, plus 3% for each year between 16 and 25 years of contributions, and 2% 
for each year beginning with the 26th year, up to a maximum of 100%. Early pensions are reduced by 8% for each year less 
than age 65 for persons who have 30 years of contributions, by 7.5% if 31 to 34 years of contributions, by 7% if 35 to 37 
years of contributions, by 6.5% if 38 to 39 years of contributions, by 6% if 40 years or more of contributions. One is required 
to stop working in order to collect beneﬁts. The occupational disability award is 55% of the beneﬁt base, plus 20% if the 
individual is 55 years old or more. Pension beneﬁts are taxable income, but disability beneﬁts are not.
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In Sweden, the old-age pension beneﬁt is comprised of a public pension and a mandatory occupational pension. The 
public pension has two parts, a basic allowance and an earnings dependent supplement. Both are tied to the so-called basic 
amount (BA), which equals roughly $4319. The basic allowance is the same for everyone and equal to 0.96BA. The earnings 
dependent supplement is given by: 
0.6APamin(a/30,1)BA, (10)
where APa is average pension points at age a. One accrues pension points from earned income in the 15 highest years 
of earnings. They are computed by taking income in excess of the BA up to 7.5BA and dividing by the BA. Furthermore, 
there is an adjustment when there are less than 30 years of work. The ﬁrst age at which the pension beneﬁt can be 
claimed is 61. The full retirement age is 65. The actuarial adjustment for early claiming is 0.5%-points for every month up 
to age 65. The actuarial adjustment for delayed claiming is 0.7% for every month up to age 70. The disability insurance 
beneﬁt is computed similarly to the old-age pension beneﬁt with the exceptions that there is no actuarial reduction for 
early claiming, and assumed pension points are computed up to age 65 based on average income from the last three 
years prior to disability. Individuals can claim disability up to age 65. There are two occupational pension programs in 
the private sector: one for blue-collar workers and one for white-collar workers. We assume that the blue-collar scheme 
applies to non-college workers and the white-collar scheme to college workers. The size of the blue-collar occupational 
pension is based on average pension points from the three best income years between the ages of 55 and 59. The beneﬁt 
is then computed by multiplying the average pension points plus 1 (to compensate for the base-amount deducted when 
calculating average pension points) by the base-amount and a factor of 0.1. A full occupational pension is granted with 30 
years of work; the beneﬁt is reduced proportionally for missing years. Similar to regular pension, only income up to 7.5 
base-amounts counts toward the blue-collar occupational pension beneﬁt. The white-collar occupational pension is based 
on income at the time of retirement. The white-collar occupational pension beneﬁt equals 10% of the wage up to 7.5 
base-amounts, 65% of the wage in excess of 7.5 and up to 20 base-amounts and 32.5% of the wage in excess of 20 and 
up to 30 base-amounts. No beneﬁt is accumulated on income above 30 base-amounts. Again, a full occupational pension 
is granted with 30 years of work, and the beneﬁt is reduced proportionally for missing years. The regular age for claiming 
both white-collar and blue-collar occupational pensions is 65. Early claiming of the white-collar occupational pension (from 
age 55 and up) is possible only if one stops working. Moreover, there is a reduction of 0.6% – points for every month up to 
age 65 for the early claiming of white-collar occupational pension. Beneﬁts are taxable income.
B.9. United Kingdom
The claiming of old-age pension beneﬁts in the United Kingdom starts at age 65. Beneﬁts are comprised of two parts, 
a ﬂat-rate portion and an earnings dependent portion. The ﬂat-rate component equals roughly $6372 per year. The earnings 
dependent component replaces 25% of average earnings from the best 20 years. The disability insurance beneﬁt is a ﬂat-rate 
beneﬁt of approximately $5936 per year. Beneﬁts above a threshold of $15 800 are taxable.
Appendix C. Computation
The state x of an individual is given by age (a), assets (k), health (h), average income from best 35 years (AIME), pen-
sion status (page, age at which started claiming pension beneﬁts, if claiming), disability status (dage, age at which started 
claiming disability beneﬁts, if claiming) and work status (rage, age at which stopped working, if no longer working). Health 
is discretized into ﬁve states: very good, good, fair, bad and very bad, based on the OECD self-assessed health survey. We 
discretize assets and pick 1213 evenly spaced grid points in k = [0, kmax], where kmax = $1 029 968.20 AIME is a continuous 
state variable. Individuals know x at the start of the period and decide how much to consume (c), how much to save (k′), 
whether or not to invest in health (ih), weather or not to work (l), and, if applicable, whether or not to apply for pen-
sion/disability beneﬁts (appR and appDI , respectively). Consumption is a continuous choice variable and solved for as the 
residual. The other choice variables are discrete by construction.
We solve the model by backward induction. We know the value function at age 81. For all possible states, we can then 
compute optimal policy and value functions at age 80, and so forth. The decision problem of the agent in a given period 
will depend on the age and past choices of the agent. Speciﬁcally, we assume that beneﬁt claiming is an absorbing state and 
subject to eligibility. To illustrate, consider an individual aged 62, who is not currently claiming beneﬁts and is still working. 
Given possible combinations of assets, health and AIME, this individual faces ﬁve possible choice combinations between 
working and claiming of beneﬁts: keep working, keep working and apply for pension beneﬁts, stop working, stop working 
and apply for pension beneﬁts, apply for disability beneﬁts. The choice space then consists of these ﬁve alternatives, the 
20 We conducted robustness checks for a few types with an even ﬁner grid and an even larger maximum value, respectively. The labor supply allocations 
were unaffected. We, therefore, feel conﬁdent that our grid choice is appropriate.
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choice of whether or not to invest in health and the savings decision. We compute the consumption choice associated with 
each of these combinations and update AIME. We then pick the utility maximizing option from this set.
Having solved for the policy functions, we simulate the model. For aggregation purposes we assume that at any given 
point in time, the economy consists of 1 00025 year olds, 100026 year olds, 100027 year olds, and so on.
To map the country-speciﬁc pension and disability rules to the model, we modify the formulas for AIME and PIA. Specif-
ically, the AIME formula is adjusted to reﬂect the number of years on which the beneﬁt is based. The PIA formula in turn 
is adjusted to incorporate a possible ﬂat-rate component and to reﬂect the differing replacement rates on average earnings. 
We incorporate the country speciﬁc eligibility rules and adjustments for early and delayed claiming in the computation of 
the actual beneﬁt.
C.1. Policy and value functions
The policy and value functions are plotted in Fig. C.1. To conserve space we only show the plots for one type (high school, 
retiree health insurance, high disutility); the plots are similar across types. We plot the policy functions for consumption 
and savings as functions of current capital, assuming the individual is in average health and stops working/takes out pension 
at the average age for that particular type. These plots are for age 55. As one would expect, consumption and savings are 
increasing in current assets. We also plot labor supply (the decision whether to work this period or to retire) as a function 
of assets. For this, we assume the agent is in average health and takes out pension beneﬁts at the average age. Labor supply 
is weakly decreasing in assets. Health investment is weakly increasing in assets, although it appears to be driven more by 
health and age than assets (plot omitted here to conserve space). Similarly, we plot the value function for one type as a 
function of assets, assuming average health and average age for stopping work/taking out pension. This plot is at age 55. As 
one would expect, the value functions are increasing in assets. 
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